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The Separation of Economics from Virtue
A Historical–Conceptual Introduction
Eric Schliesser
The ofﬁcial attitude (of which Robbins is perhaps the best known con-
temporary exponent) now became more austere: the study of ends was
held to be a problem in ethics and the economist qua scientist had no
special competence in this ﬁeld, even as applied to economic policy. Quite
recently there has been a return to the view that the treatment of welfare
problems is an integral part of economic analysis. The new welfare
economists claim that many policies can be shown (to other economists?)
to be good or bad without entering a dangerous quagmire of value
judgments.
George J. Stigler1
The aim of this chapter is to explain what philosophical commitments
drove mainstream professional economists to understand their own discip-
line as leaving no space for ethics (including virtue) between, say, 1883 and
1977. In particular, I argue that economics embraced a technocratic concep-
tion of politics and science. An important theme of my chapter is that
philosophers, too, embraced and continue to embrace a number of com-
mitments about philosophy and science that entrench a sharp division of
labor between philosophers and economics and that keep not just ethics,
but virtue, outside of economics. Many of these philosophers’ commitments
were adopted by economists, such that they could assume, in practice, that
there is a self-sufﬁcient apolitical domain of pure economics.2 So, in effect,
this chapter explores the origin and nature of a conceptual split between
economics and ethics.
There are two subsidiary themes in my chapter that are not fully worked out
in it, but play a non-trivial role in the development that I sketch. First, I pay
some attention to the role of so-called epistemic virtues that good economic
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inquirers need to possess by virtue of the split between economics and ethics.
By “epistemic virtue” I mean to refer to the moral character or moral prop-
erties of the scientiﬁc economist. I will not discuss the epistemic virtues
commonly associated with scientists, such as patience, objectivity, disinterest-
edness, and humility, although these do operate in the background, but I will
call attention to those epistemic virtues that take on special urgency in light of
the larger development. Second, I also consider the ways in which the expert
scientist economist can (and cannot) assume to be agreeing with the values of
the society she studies and hopes to advise as a policy scientist.
By “technocratic conception of politics and science,” I mean here to capture
the following three features of a resilient and inﬂuential image within eco-
nomics.3 First, it is characterized by the ideal that, with social knowledge and
its progress, substantial political disagreement can be eliminated. For example,
as Milton Friedman claims in his Nobel lecture:
Many countries around the world are today experiencing socially destructive
inﬂation, abnormally high unemployment, misuse of economic resources, and, in
some cases, the suppression of human freedom not because evil men deliberately
sought to achieve these results, nor because of differences in values among their
citizens, but because of erroneous judgments about the consequences of govern-
ment measures: errors that at least in principle are capable of being corrected by
the progress of positive economic science.4
Second, and in particular, this ideal of conﬂict-free politics presupposes (as is
clear from the quoted passage above) considerable value-unanimity in society.
So, for example, in a famous article, the Chicago-school economists George
Stigler and Gary Becker write that “one may usefully treat tastes as stable over
time and similar among people,” and that establishing this point “is the central
task of this essay.”5 When value unanimity is granted, one is allowed to assume
representative agents and ordinary welfare economics is possible as a kind of
(social) engineering science.6
Third, the conception requires an image of science in which one of the
central aims of policy scientists is to achieve consensus (or lack of disagree-
ment). In economics this idea goes back, as I show, at least to Henry Sidgwick’s
(1883) Principles of Political Economy.7 In this chapter, I will note that the
adoption of certain mathematical tools was, in part, designed to facilitate such
consensus generation. It is worth emphasizing, however, that (a) I am not
claiming that all consensus generation tools were introduced with a techno-
cratic conception in mind, and (b) that the expectation of consensus was by no
means universal even among those ﬁrmly committed to a mathematical
approach. Friedman’s sometime co-author, L.J. Savage, for example, insists
in The Foundations of Statistics, that “we must be prepared to ﬁnd reasoning
inadequate to bring about complete agreement.”8 But Savage’s view became a
minority position.9
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Before I turn to my argument, I wish to explain the choice of dates that
I have adopted. The concluding date was chosen because several of the most
important papers I mention were published in that year. I could have chosen
more recent statements to illuminate the claims I make, 10 but, as the chapters
in this volume suggest, professional economics may be changing so that the
question of virtue’s role in economics can be asked anew. In particular, my
chapter does not touch on the increasing use of data-mining and so-called
natural experiments within economics, and this is why I do not wish to convey
completeness.
The starting date is a bit more arbitrary (although not entirely): it is the year
in which Sidgwick published the ﬁrst edition of The Principles of Political
Economy, a textbook designed for a self-standing discipline of (political)
economics, distinct from moral philosophy, at Cambridge University, a de-
partment that was eventually (within a decade) co-founded with Alfred
Marshall.11 This textbook, and works by Alfred Marshall and J.N. Keynes
(a Cambridge logician-methodologist of economics and the father of the more
famous Keynes) which I discuss below, also helped facilitate the shift of
economics away from the so-called Historical and Moral Sciences Tripos to
a self-standing Economics Tripos in 1903.12 Sidgwick was the leading ethicist
of his time (and arguably one of the most enduringly inﬂuential philosophers
of the English language) and extremely sophisticated philosophically.
For, the character of political economy changed between, say, Adam Smith’s
“moral science” (hisWealth of Nations was published in 1776) and the period
in which economics became thought of as a “social science.”13 To be clear, and
to avoid a common confusion, the 18th century term “moral science” (or
“moral philosophy”—“philosophy” and “science” are often treated as syn-
onyms at the time) does not quite mean what we might think it means.14
Condorcet, for example, understood “by this term all those sciences that have
as their object either the human mind itself, or the relations of men to
another.”15 Moral sciences were opposed to physical sciences and distin-
guished by the kinds of causes to be discussed. Moral sciences dealt with
moral causes, wherein “moral” meant something like “social.” For example,
institutions, norms, education, language, emotions, and property-relations
were all thought of as moral causes; by contrast, geography, climate, mechan-
ics, and matter-theory were physical causes.
Therefore, eighteenth century “moral” science and twentieth century
“social” science are closer in outlook than is commonly thought. Even so,
the two practices have different presuppositions: social science often presup-
poses a version of the fact–value distinction, whereas in moral science, “the
natural course” or “nature” is often itself normative. If acting according to
nature, or properly cultivated nature, is a key criterion or means towards the
practice of virtue—as it is in many traditions—then moral science might be a
guide to the practice of virtue.
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Now, Smith has a traditional and demanding understanding of virtue. His
most explicit and simultaneously very demanding deﬁnition is as follows:
“virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises
far above what is vulgar and ordinary.”16 By “vulgar” Smith does not mean
somebody rude in our sense, but rather something akin to our “run-of-the-mill”
(which can encompass rudeness). Few people writing today would accept such a
demanding standard of virtue, which is apt for a classical sage. (Most chapters in
this volume work with a less demanding standard.) Smith’s political economy
did not presuppose, expect, or describe virtuous people in this demanding sense,
although he did hope that by reducing human misery and power differences,
commercial society would make it more likely that such virtue, and also less
demanding virtues, could be practiced within the rule of law.17
As many other commentators have noted, Smith did think of prudence as a
virtue:
In the steadiness of his industry and frugality, in his steadily sacriﬁcing the ease
and enjoyment of the present moment for the probable expectation of the still
greater ease and enjoyment of a more distant but more lasting period of time, the
prudent man is always both supported and rewarded by the entire approbation of
the impartial spectator, and of the representative of the impartial spectator, the
man within the breast.18
So, moral science, as practiced by Smith in his political economy, presupposed
and made explicit further, less demanding moral values, such as humanity,
equity, ﬂourishing, and prudence, that are often thought extrinsic to the
practice of late nineteenth century social science.19 This is, in part, due to a
new conception of “science” in the wake of Whewell coining the term “scien-
tist” (while reviewing a book by Mary Somerville) and Comte’s positivist
interpretation of “science.” The normative conception of “nature,” while not
wholly eliminated, was not part of the ofﬁcial self-understanding, or image, of
science. Sidgwick, whose Methods of Ethics and History of Ethics still frames
philosophy’s self-understanding, was not a passive bystander to this historical
transformation, and so we have to understand his recasting of political
economy as a principled decision.20
In what follows, I give a historical sketch of the adoption of the technocratic
conception of politics and science within mainstream economics. Along the
way, I call attention to the key distinctions that left no place within economics
for virtue in the demanding sense quoted from Smith, as well as in the less
demanding sense, such as equity, humanity, prudence, and so forth, that he
wished to promote in his political economy. I proceed roughly chronologic-
ally: in the ﬁrst section I focus primarily on the late nineteenth century, and in
the second section I focus on the period after World War II in which eco-
nomics became the dominant policy science. I will emphasize the links be-
tween the two periods by way of the now-forgotten John Neville Keynes.
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1. SIDGWICK, KEYNES, AND THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN POSITIVE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS
Utilitarianism was, and still is perhaps, the most inﬂuential longest
continuing tradition in English speaking moral philosophy. While it
perhaps can claim no writer of the stature of Aristotle and Kant (their
ethical works being in a class of themselves), taking the tradition as a
whole, and viewing its extent and continuity and ever increasing reﬁne-
ment in certain parts of the view, utilitarianism is perhaps unique in its
collective brilliance. One must remember that utilitarianism is historically
part of a doctrine of society, and is not simply a detached philosophical
doctrine. The utilitarians were also political theorists and had a psycho-
logical theory. Also, utilitarianism has had considerable inﬂuence in
certain parts of Economics. Part of the explanation for this is that if we
look at the more important economists in the English tradition before
1900 and the well-known utilitarian philosophers, we’ll ﬁnd that they’re
the same people; only Ricardo is missing. Hume and Smith were both
utilitarian philosophers and economists . . . Sidgwick and the great econo-
mist Marshall were both in the same department at Cambridge, when
they decided to found a separate department of economics around 1896.
Since that time there has been a split, although utilitarianism still
inﬂuences economics, and welfare economics has a close connection to
the utilitarian tradition. Still, since 1900 the tradition has divided into two
more or less mutually-ignoring groups, the economists and the philo-
sophers, to the reciprocal disadvantage of both . . .The division is not easy
to rectify given the pressures of specialization, and much else. It is also
very difﬁcult nowadays to get a sufﬁcient grasp of topics in both subjects
for one person to intelligently discuss them.
—John Rawls21
In this section I ﬁrst turn to Sidgwick and explain how he and his successors
promoted a conceptual split between economics and ethics. Conceptually and
methodologically the split required the embrace of a certain image of science.
By an “image of science” I mean to call attention to a list of characteristics that
function as a kind of shorthand for representing science; these characteristics
are used in polemical or educational contexts often to justify or rely on the
epistemic authority of a practice described as “science.” This image is often
accompanied by a privileged list of scientiﬁc or epistemic virtues. I call it an
“image” to highlight that when such an image is deployed, there tends to be
lots of tacit commitments about the nature of knowledge, the nature of reality,
the nature of society, and also the nature of science.
In the epigraph to this section, John Rawls, himself a great student of the
history of economics and philosophy,22 notes that in the wake of Sidgwick
there has been a “split” between “philosophers and economists” even within
the “utilitarian tradition” as well as the two disciplines generally. Here I leave
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aside the (opportunistic and somewhat misleading) characterization of Hume
and Smith as belonging to the utilitarian tradition.23 Rawls does not attribute
the “split” to Sidgwick, but I follow Rawls in assuming that in the ﬁnal decade
of the nineteenth century, Sidgwick and Marshall were part of an attempt at a
decisive change.24 I use “attempt” because part of the point of what follows is
that the “attempt” did not, despite disciplinary and educational splits, wholly
succeed and I exhibit this by showing ongoing mutual explicit and implicit
inﬂuence by philosophers and economists.
In the introduction to his Principles, Sidgwick is explicit that his aim is to
salvage “the really sound and valuable results of previous [economic] thought”
from “the waves of disputation”—in other words, to “eliminate unnecessary
controversy.” For “[Principles] is written in the belief that the reaction above
described against the treatment of Political Economy as an established science
was inevitable and even salutary; but that it has been carried too far.”25
Sidgwick’s project within economics is to create a technical apparatus that
produces consensus among experts; without this, the political economist has
no special standing as the expert worth listening to by policy-makers. Beyond
the area of agreement, all existing further disagreement has either to be caused
by conﬂicting facts (as Sidgwick acknowledges in context) or by fundamental
differences in values (as Sidgwick describes in great detail in his later discus-
sion of the legacy of Adam Smith). Thus, his project is to create a (mathem-
atical) body of doctrine (about economic causes) that economists could
rally around, so it could become the most important policy science. As
Sidgwick writes:
In those parts of this work in which I have used chieﬂy deductive reasoning,
I have made it my special aim to state explicitly and keep clearly in view the
limited and conditional applicability of the conclusions attained by it.
With this view I have been generally careful to avoid any dogmatic statements
on practical points. It is very rarely, if ever, that the practical economic questions
which are presented to the statesman can be unhesitatingly decided by abstract
reasoning from elementary principles. For the right solution of them full and
exact knowledge of the fact of the particular case is commonly required; and the
difﬁculty of ascertaining these facts is often such as to prevent the attainment of
positive conclusions by any strictly scientiﬁc procedure.26
According to Sidgwick, economics is (in part) an abstract policy science whose
advice guides the “statesman,” but the mathematical and theoretical frame-
work that is capable of generating consensus has “limited and conditional
applicability.” For, economic policy advice does not merely require deduction
from foundational economic theory to particular consequences, but also
knowledge of (relevant) particular facts. While there is consensus among
experts over economic theory, there would be (more) consensus over policy
advice if (a) all relevant facts were known and (b) policy experts relied on the
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same core principles from which they deduce their (conditional) advice. It is
no coincidence that the collection of massive amounts of data and the
development of mathematical theory have become an increasing priority.27
In the passage quoted above, Sidgwick relies on a distinction regarding
economics between the theoretical consensus it can generate and the univocal
policy guidance it could offer if there were better data and consensus over
values (which is one reason why the theoretical framework is “conditional”).
He develops the idea and makes it more explicit as follows in describing the
status of laissez faire in scientiﬁc economics:
It must be obvious, however, as soon as it is pointed out, that the investigation of
the laws that determine actual prices, wages and proﬁts, so far as these depend on
the free competition of individuals, is essentially distinct from the inquiry how far
it is desirable that the action of free competition should be restrained or mod-
iﬁed . . . So far as the purely scientiﬁc economist studies primarily the results that
tend to be produced by perfectly free competition, it is not because he has any
predilection for this order of things—for science knows nothing of such
preferences—but merely because its greater simplicity renders it easier to grasp.
He holds that a knowledge of these simpler relations precedes, in the order of
study, the investigation of more complex economic problems that result from
competition modiﬁed by disturbing causes. But the adoption of a perfectly free
competition as a scientiﬁc ideal—a means of simplifying the economic facts which
actual society presents, for the convenience of general reasoning—does not imply
its adoption as a practical ideal, which the statesman or philanthropist ought to
aim at realising as completely as possible.28
Here Sidgwick articulates a sharp division between the study of a (simpliﬁed)
model or abstract reality and the articulation or discovery of what is desirable.
The former is capable of generating consensus, whereas the latter, the devel-
opment of a “practical ideal” that is implemented by a “statesman or philan-
thropist,” is not a matter of economic science, but instead belongs properly to
ethics. As it happens, Sidgwick also thinks ethics can be made into something
like a science: “ethics seeks to attain systematic and precise general knowledge
of what ought to be, and in this sense his aims and methods may properly be
termed ‘scientiﬁc.’ ”29 But he makes a sharp distinction between the agreement
over beliefs with “other members in our society” and the agreement over “new
beliefs” that is subsequent ethical argument.30
So, within economics it is not permitted to take such ethical science for
granted. That is to say, the key epistemic virtue presupposed by a Sidgwickian
scientiﬁc economist is self-command (or self-limitation); if she wishes to avoid
needless conﬂict, she limits the scope of her claims to a model (or, less
anachronistically, hypothetical) reality.31 In fact, Sidgwick thinks the virtue
of “self-control,” which is a “habit of resistance to desires and fears,” just is
“practical wisdom” (so far as practical wisdom “is a virtue”).32 That is to say, a
true Sidgwickian economist would possess practical wisdom.
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To be sure, Sidgwick’s image of science in which science generates consen-
sus is not the only possible image of science, despite the fact that it would seem
quite natural to those of us trained up on Kuhnian notions of “normal” science
as consensus. This is not the place to explore alternative images of science
more permissive of permanent disagreement; but these were developed by
inﬂuential contemporaries of Sidgwick.33
To sum up my treatment of Sidgwick, in effect he proposes a threefold
distinction between theoretical political economy, practical political economy,
and ethics. The ﬁrst and third are theoretical enterprises in which consensus is
possible; the second guides policy and is implemented by a statesman or
philanthropist, and in it there is no consensus because of uncertainty over
particular facts.34 Therefore, we have in Sidgwick already the broad outlines of
the technocratic conception of science and politics.35
The scheme sketched in Sidgwick is elaborated and made precise in much
greater detail by his Cambridge colleague, John Neville Keynes, whose now all-
but-forgotten work The Scope and Method of Political Economy was probably
the ﬁrst self-standing contribution to what we might call “philosophy of
economics” in the English language.36 Keynes, too, makes a distinction be-
tween economic science and ethics: “it is not . . . the function of the [economic]
science to pass ethical judgments.”37 But Keynes is not a slavish follower of his
more famous colleague. He writes:
There is a further reason why a positive science of political economy should
receive distinct and independent recognition. With the advance of knowledge, it
may be possible to come to a general agreement in regard to what is or what may
be in the economic world, sooner than any similar agreement is attainable in
regard to the rules by which economics of individuals and communities should be
guided. The former requires only that there shall be unanimity as to the facts; the
latter may be prevented by conﬂicting ideals, as well as by divergent views as to
the actual or the possible.38
Unlike Sidgwick, Keynes does not expect (foreseeable) agreement over social
values. The reason for this is not that he expects moral pluralism (along, say,
the lines of Max Weber, who thinks that the increased complex division of
labor of modern society would generate plurality of values),39 but rather that
he thinks that people’s (modal) expectations will be non-uniform (or
“divergent”).
We might say that he expects that, when it comes to what ought to be the
case, Keynes thinks that people’s sense of reality is going to be different.40 In
fact, he introduces enduring terminology to describe the practice that relates to
social ideals, calling it “normative economics” (or “applied ethics”), which is a
“body of systematized knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to be;”
furthermore, it’s “about the ideal as distinguished from the actual,” and
normative economics consists of “judgments.”41 Crucially, normative projects,
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even the ones that pertain to economic phenomena, should be kept outside
economics (which is why “applied ethics” is a better term for the enterprise).
Again, we see that one of the key assumed theoretical virtues that a practicing
positive economist should have is a kind of self-command in order not to
overstep the boundaries of positive science.
Not unlike Sidgwick, Keynes expects economics to generate agreement over
the model reality (“economic world”) and its possibilities (“what may be”).
The domain that can be subject to consensus he calls “positive economics,”
which is just a “body of systematized knowledge of what is.”42 These facts,
once established, are not supposed to be controversial. Again, similar to
Sidgwick, Keynes thinks that there ought to be a bridge between positive
economics and actual policy-making. This he called the “art of economics,”
which is a “system of rules for the attainment of a given [policy] end.”43 He
does not seem to have thought that the art of economics is capable of
generating a consensus (again in agreement with Sidgwick); rather, it’s the
domain of (defeasible) maxims and practical precepts. As I explain in
Section 2, this threefold distinction among the art of economics, positive
economics, and normative economics is turned into a cornerstone of Milton
Friedman’s methodological writing about economics.
But Keynes is not merely a terminological innovator over Sidgwick. He also
adds a temporal dimension to the image of science that was relevant to
positive economics. Keynes thinks that sciences can be more or less mature:
for example, economics was a less mature (or less “deﬁnitive”) science than,
say, “physics and astronomy.” For Keynes relies on the idea that a science
develops through different stages, including a “descriptive or classiﬁcatory”
stage before reaching an ultimate (or “deﬁnitive”) “deductive” stage.44 In fact,
sciences, including economics can undergo “revolutions.” One important
example of this is the so-called marginal revolution of Walras, Menger, and
Jevons (of the 1870s); Keynes singles out Menger, in particular, as one such
revolutionary, who is also self-reﬂective about the method and history of
economics.45 So, in Keynes’s image of science there is, over time, development
from primitive science (without consensus) to mature science (with consen-
sus) as well as the possibility of revolutions between mature theories.46
I mention Keynes’ image of science not just because of its intrinsic interest
(and the ways in which it preﬁgures Kuhnian philosophy of science), but also
because this image gets deployed in order to keep ethics outside of positive
economics. As Keynes writes:
If political economy regarded from the theoretical standpoint is to make good
progress, it is essential that all extrinsic or premature sources of controversy
should be eliminated; and we may be sure that the more its principles are
discussed independently of ethical and practical considerations, the sooner will
the science emerge from its controversial stage. The intrusion of ethics into
economics cannot but multiply and perpetuate sources of disagreement.47
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We can see that the independence of positive economics from both applied
ethics and the art of economics is, in fact, treated as a (nearly) necessary
precondition for progress in positive economics. It follows from this that
Keynes thinks of applied ethics as a source of permanent disagreement.
Keynes’ key move, thus, is not the distinction between (a) a realm of facts
and their generalizations that may lead to unanimity and (b) a realm of values
that are sources of disagreement. Rather, the key is that he deploys some such
distinction in the context of a “theory” of scientiﬁc “progress” in which a ﬁeld
develops from the immature, conﬂict-ridden stages to mature stages charac-
terized by considerable agreement. He sketches a route to progress in know-
ledge only if economics can be cleansed from ethics.
Sadly, Keynes does not reﬂect on all the difﬁculties with the idea of making
theoretical or positive economics independent of ethical judgments. But, in
disciplinary practices, Keynes’ position is attractive to those economists who
wish to “get on” with their research and possibly sell its fruits to others
(politicians and philanthropists), as well as to those philosophers who are
enamored by the idea that they are the experts of pure ethical matters. Keynes’s
position becomes second nature to those educated or disciplined as professional
economists or philosophers; it is how they (we) learn to see the world.
A generation later, Lionel Robbins captures the upshot of Sidgwick’s and
Keynes’ position nicely when he writes that “economics deals with ascertain-
able facts; ethics with valuations and obligations,” while recasting the nature of
economics subtly:
And, quite apart from all questions of methodology, there is a very practical
justiﬁcation for such a procedure in the rough-and-tumble of political struggle,
differences of opinion may arise either as a result of differences about ends or as a
result of differences about the means of attaining ends. Now, as regards the ﬁrst
type of difference, neither Economics nor any other science can provide any
solvent. If we disagree about ends it is a case of thy blood or mine—or live and let
live, according to the importance of the difference, or the relative strength of our
opponents. But, if we disagree about means, then scientiﬁc analysis can often help
us to resolve our differences. If we disagree about the morality of the taking of
interest (and we understand what we are talking about), then there is no room for
argument. But if we disagree about the objective implications of ﬂuctuations in
the rate of interest, then economic analysis should enable us to settle our
dispute . . . Surely, for the sake of securing what agreement we can in a world in
which avoidable differences of opinion are all too common, it is worthwhile
carefully delimiting those ﬁelds of enquiry where this kind of settlement is
possible from those where it is not to be hoped for —it is worthwhile delimiting
the neutral area of science from the more disputable area of moral and
political philosophy.48
Here the “neutral area” of positive economics has explicitly become what one
might call “instrumental reason.” What Robbins describes is, by Sidgwick’s
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lights, a species of “technical skill” which selects “the best means to given ends
in a certain limited and special department of human action,” a form of
“worldly-wisdom.”49 In limiting economics’ domain as a conditional science,
it becomes possible to generate the hoped-for agreement. Economics here has
the character of an engineering science that works within given constraints.
Robbins himself thought this meant that so-called “welfare economics” was
illegitimate (and so he could block social engineering). But in his landmark
1947 work Foundations of Economic Analysis, which inaugurated the so-called
mathematical revolution in economics, Paul Samuelson (correctly) noted that
all this entails is that if there are values, then the economist’s job can be to
analyze what follows from them: “it is a legitimate exercise of economic
analysis to examine the consequences of various judgments.”50
By contrast, according to Robbins there is little hope to generate agreement
over ends: recall, from the passage quoted above, that “it is a case of thy blood
or mine—or live and let live, according to the importance of the difference, or
the relative strength of our opponents.” Moral and political philosophy now
have become a ﬁeld of permanent disunity—no surprise he would have
thought so during the 1930s with communism, fascism, and liberalism being
deadly rivals—disconnected from economics.51 While Robbins himself was no
friend of technocratic social engineering, it is—with the beneﬁt of hindsight—
no surprise too that his understanding of economics carried the day within
economics after World War II. It provided the economists (as was his inten-
tion) with a way of understanding and selling themselves as neutral experts
and inaugurated a great age of a technocratic conception of economics. The
aim of Section 2 is to argue that this technocratic conception was shared by
post-world-war Keynesians and Chicago-school pro-free-market-types.
This is not to deny that the engineering conception bequeathed by Robbins
was not contested. Keynes hated it52 and so did his ideological rival, the
Chicago economist Frank Knight;53 but while they made many telling and
undeniably sound criticisms, ultimately their resistance was swept away by the
cold-war growth of mathematical economics (despite opposition from econo-
mists like Kenneth Boulding).54 From the vantage point of the technocratic
conception of politics and science, what was required was (a) a commitment to
consensus in society and (b) ways to remove conceptual barriers to embracing
consensus in science.
In Section 2 my focus is exclusively on (a), but on (b) let me just note two
signiﬁcant developments during the early period of the formal revolution in
economics (from 1945 to 1955). First, in polemical exchanges (known in part as
the Koopmans-Vining debate),55 Koopmans defended the use of econometric
techniques because they could generate policy-relevant predictions.56 Second,
while leading, ideologically diverse economists of the 1920s and 1930s, such as
JohnMaynardKeynes and FrankKnight, embraced epistemic andmetaphysical
versions of uncertainty, their views were tacitly rejected and displaced by
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commitments to probable risk and uncertainty as randomness, both of which
were friendly to mathematical treatment.57 For example, the Nobel-winning
Chicago economist (and student of Milton Friedman), Gary Becker, argues that
agents “will be represented by a probabilistic model in which decisions are
determined so to speak, by the throw of a multisided die.”58
2 . POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS AND
THE TECHNOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF POLITICS
During the 1930 and 1940s, an age of “revolution” in economics, the “new
welfare economics” (NWE) became an autonomous, highly technical discip-
line within mathematical economics.59 This revolution is associated with Paul
Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis.60 While its formulae were
developed within a utilitarian, moral philosophical framework, by focusing on
so-called “revealed preferences,” NWE dispensed with the psychological com-
mitments of utilitarianism so it could explore the formal characteristics of
social choice without, as it claimed, highly contested psychological and moral
judgments.61 This development ﬁt well with the technocratic self-conception
of a burgeoning ﬁeld that was about to become the privileged policy science,
displacing, law, history, and civil engineering, and winning out over sociology
and political science.
Samuelson’s vision was contested in a ﬁerce, brief exchange with George
Stigler at the height of World War II in the pages of the American Economic
Review. Their polemic reveals the signiﬁcance of the issues central to this
chapter. Stigler, winner of the 1982 Nobel Prize in economics, argued in 1943
that NWE assumes a question-begging consensus over values in a given
society.62 Stigler criticizes what soon became the dominant approach within
professional economics that combined sophisticated mathematical technique,
a focus on revealed preference, and an understanding of economics (inspired
by Robbins) as resource maximization under constraint. Near the end of his
discussion, Stigler writes:
Talcott Parsons probably had economists in mind when he wrote: “For it is a fact
that social existence depends to a large extent on a moral consensus of its
members and that the penalty of its too radical breakdown is social extinction.
This fact is one which the type of liberal whose theoretical background is
essentially utilitarian is all too apt to ignore—with unfortunate practical as well
as theoretical consequences.” At the level of economic policy, then, it is totally
misleading to talk of ends as individual and random; they are fundamentally
collective and organized. If this conclusion be accepted, and accept it we must,
the economist may properly exceed the narrow conﬁnes of economic analysis. He
may cultivate a second discipline, the determination of the ends of his society
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particularly relevant to economic policy. This discipline might be called, follow-
ing J.N. Keynes, applied ethics.63
While the American Economic Review was already the most important journal
within economics, Stigler’s article opens with a long epigraph from Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics.64 Stigler then targets the formal revolution with an argu-
ment that was philosophical, not mathematical. In particular, Stigler argues that
economists presuppose a moral and political consensus when they are doing
policy science. Stigler—who is here echoing his teacherKnight—takes for granted
that the economic sphere is framed or constrained by political or social ends.65 (It
is on this point that Stigler cites Parsons approvingly.66) Thus, Stigler’s argument
distinguishes between pure economic analysis, in which ends are thought of as
individual and random, and policy science (or applied ethics), where ends are
uniﬁed; and it is this distinction that drives him to accept Keynes’ own distinction
between positive economics and applied ethics.
Stigler’s point is not that economists should avoid policy science. Echoing
Sidgwick and Keynes, he thinks that economists ought to cultivate such
applied ethics, and that this can be pursued scientiﬁcally:
It is quite another thing to conclude that therefore ends of good policy are beyond
the realm of scientiﬁc discussion.
For surely the primary requisite of a working social system is a consensus on
ends. The individual members of society must agree upon the major ends which
that society is to seek. If any large share of the population actively disagrees with
the society’s ends, and in particular if it believes that the system is unfair by the
group’s criteria, the social system will surely disintegrate, probably with violence.
This is almost axiomatic in modern social theory.67
It might seem that, for Stigler, economists should try to discover empirically
what the “consensus” over society’s “major ends” involves. But this is not what
happened. Rather, economists ran with the other implication: that there is
such a consensus can be discerned by the lack of civil strife (or even war).68
So, Stigler’s criticism of the main thrust of the formal revolution (as
characterized by the NWE), while perhaps motivated by displeasure with the
political direction that welfare economics might take, is not ultimately political
but philosophical; he insists that the normative presuppositions of NWE
ought to be different than the assumptions in pure (positive) economics.
Stigler argues for greater self-understanding on the part of economists about
the essentially political nature of welfare economics when applied to societies.
In context, Stigler’s point is meant to warn against two tendencies: ﬁrst, the
tendency to import the representative agent into the pure part of economic
analysis, and second, the tendency to forget the contentious nature of assum-
ing that that society’s ends are uniﬁed.69 Stigler’s argument presupposes, of
course, that there is a self-sufﬁcient apolitical domain of pure economics.
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In response, Samuelson never denies this; instead, he focuses on some
technical mistakes in Stigler’s examples, ridicules Stigler’s tacit elitism (“frank-
ness necessitates the regrettable admission that neither the old nor new welfare
economics qualiﬁes as sprightly conversation in the Dale Carnegie, the Oscar
Wilde, or even the Oxford Movement sense”) and insists that NWE applies
only to “a limited set of pairs of situations, [between which] it does tell us
which would be better if we had the choice between them” (emphases in
original).70 Samuelson insists that NWE rests on “the relatively mild assump-
tions that (1) ‘more’ goods are ‘better’ than ‘less’ goods; (2) individual tastes
are to ‘count’ in the sense that it is ‘better’ if all individuals are ‘better’ off.”71
While there are serious metaphysical and axiological issues that haunt these
two assumptions, this seems to have ended debate over NWE within econom-
ics for several decades.72
Ofﬁcially, the stance of the profession echoed Samuelson’s deﬂationary
position about the aspirations of NWE,73 but in practice it provided a “pro-
fessional consensus” for so-called “applied” welfare economics, “to increase, to
society’s general beneﬁt, the inﬂuence on public policy of good economic
analysis.” I am quoting from a piece by Arnold Harberger, the intellectual
mentor of the so-called Chicago-Boys and a colleague of Stigler and Friedman
at Chicago in the 1960s and 1970s.74
A few years later, in reviewing Samuelson’s Foundations, Stigler alludes to
his exchange with Samuelson:
I persist in my belief that this [NWE] is one of the less fertile areas that modern
economists till; it is symptomatic that we have elaborate instructions on how to
form welfare judgments that do not depend on value judgments, but we have no
illustration of the application of this technique to a real problem of contemporary
policy. Samuelson indeed offers much support for this skeptical view, by this
enumeration of the assumptions of the new welfare economics . . .most of which
are held to be partly invalid. But he fails to examine other facets of the problem,
one of which, I think, is especially signiﬁcant. When economists are writing freely
on desirable policy, that is, when they are not writing on methodology, the
disputes are almost always over how the economic system works, and not over
the goals that should be sought.75
Despite criticizing Samuelson, Stigler here anticipates the central commitment
of the technocratic conception—consensus over fundamental values—made
by Friedman in his 1953 methodology essay: “I venture the judgment, how-
ever, that currently in the Western world, and especially in the United States,
differences about economic policy among disinterested citizens derive pre-
dominant from different predictions about the economic consequences of
taking action—differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress
of positive economics.”76 So, given the embrace of the technocratic conception
of economics and science, political conﬂict can be eliminated once economics
has become mature.
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Note, however, that in his review of Samuelson, Stigler assumes consensus
over values among the experts (“economists . . .writing freely on desirable
policy”), not necessarily the public.77 In fact, in the concluding paragraph of
the review, Stigler advocates that Samuelson make his work intelligible to
fellow experts, other economists, not the public at large. This is a matter of
“responsibility” to “scholarly canons,” not society. By Stigler’s lights, then,
economists have duties to the guild of experts or, perhaps, he thinks there is an
ethics of inquiry; but these duties are not necessarily to society. (If economists
are also treated as ordinary agents, then one can say about them what Stigler
notes about “particular entrepreneurs,” that they are “in the industry because
it is the most proﬁtable place to be.”) Of course, once economists are trained in
or recruited from the ranks that understand “advanced calculus, higher
algebra, and differential equations,” and it is assumed that they agree on
fundamental values (which they are taught is not part of their subject matter),
then the door is opened to economists-as-social-engineers who, once the
technocratic conception of politics and ethics is accepted, neither question
given ends qua scientists and may overlook tacit normative commitments of
their theories and concepts. (Stigler does not offer an analysis of the distinc-
tion between fundamental and lesser values.)
Thus, in the context of criticizing the main theoretical workhorse of eco-
nomics as a technocratic policy science, Stigler explicitly accepts J.N. Keynes’
contrast between positive economics and normative economics. But rather
than rooting normative economics in a distinct science of ethics, Stigler, after
reﬂecting on his exchange with Samuelson, claims (with a nod to Talcott
Parsons) that its normative principles are either major ends that must be
presupposed by any existing political community or, at least, are presupposed
by the community of experts. So, Stigler does not deny that a community of
experts requires shared values or even an ethics. (He had, in fact, an enduring
interest in the sociology of knowledge.78) But he insists that it is not a proper
part of economics to reﬂect on values.
When Stigler’s life-long friend, Milton Friedman, articulated his methodo-
logical commitments in 1953—after intensive correspondence and discussion
with Stigler79—he begins by explicitly embracing Keynes’s distinctions:
In his admirable book on The Scope andMethod of Political Economy John Neville
Keynes distinguishes among “a positive science . . . a body of systematized know-
ledge concerning what is; a normative or regulative science . . . a body of system-
atized knowledge discussing criteria of what ought to be . . . an art . . . a system of
rules for the attainment of a given end”; he comments that “confusion between
them is common and has been the source of many mischievous errors”; and urges
the importance of “recognizing a distinct positive science of political economy.80
As we have seen, in 1953, Friedman is not entirely assured that economics is
fully mature.81 But on the whole, during subsequent decades, the discipline
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embraces the idea and Kuhnian tropes and rhetoric became ubiquitous in
economics.82
One further reason to highlight Friedman’s 1953 essay is that it also
articulates a conception of scientiﬁc objectivity in terms of rule-following
and a publicity requirement.
In seeking to make a science as “objective” as possible, our aim should be to
formulate rules explicitly in so far as possible and continually to widen the range
of phenomena for which it is possible to do so. But, no matter how successful we
may be in this attempt, there inevitably will remain room for judgment in
applying the rules.83
In relying on a public (“explicitly”) rule-following conception of objectivity,
Friedman thereby minimizes the requirement of theoretical virtue(s) among
scientiﬁc practitioners. As he recognizes, of course, he cannot eliminate the
requirement of good judgment among scientiﬁc practitioners entirely.
To forestall twofold misunderstanding, I am not claiming that the techno-
cratic conception of politics is an autonomous invention by economists or
only adopted by them. In particular, the technocratic conception of politics is
also fully embraced in the seminal text of twentieth century political philoso-
phy, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Rawls’ approach can be understood as
offering a decision procedure that generates unanimity.84 In fact, in doing so,
Rawls appeals to Knight’s claim that “legislative discussion” is an expert
“objective inquiry” and not a contest between interests!85 So, Rawls accepts
the third condition of the technocratic conception of economics even outside
science, for “moral philosophy.”86
Moreover, Rawls writes:
By way of summing up, the essential point is that despite the individualistic
features of justice as fairness, the two principles of justice are not contingent upon
existing desires or present social conditions . . .By assuming certain general
desires, such as the desire for primary social goods, and by taking as a basis the
agreements that would be made in a suitably deﬁned initial situation, we can
achieve requisite independence from existing circumstances. The original pos-
ition is so characterized that unanimity is possible; the deliberations of any one
person are typical of all. Moreover, the same will hold for the considered judg-
ments of the citizens of a well-ordered society effectively regulated by the
principles of justice. Everyone has a similar sense of justice and in this respect
a well-ordered society is homogeneous. Political argument appeals to this
moral consensus.87
Here Rawls clearly subscribes to the ﬁrst two features of the technocratic
conception. Even so, we should be alerted at once that Rawls’ position is
idiosyncratic because he resists securing liberties by “uncertain and speculative
actuarial calculations.”88 But I leave this non-trivial complication (and the role
of uncertainty more generally in Rawls) aside.
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3. CONCLUSION
Thus, within the technocratic conception of politics and science there is little
room for theorizing about the exercise of virtue of economic agents and, more
reﬂexively, by economic theoreticians. The theorized agents (and markets) are
increasingly thought of as responding to incentives89 and constraints as well as
to be otherwise random in their behavior. Even the intellectual virtues of the
theoreticians tend to be assumed or they get displaced by conceptions of
objectivity as primarily, disinterested rule-following. In this latter way, the
economist qua scientist gets conceived of as a kind of Weberian bureaucrat.
However, this (often tacit) conception of the scientist as rule-follower is
now being displaced by a conception of science promoted by grant agencies
that seeks to make the scientist respond to scientometrically-informed incen-
tives. For, in this chapter I have not discussed the “demand” side: that
governments, foundations, grant agencies, and university administrators
have also shaped disciplinary discussions.90
In this chapter, I have focused on how philosophical ideas, developed within
economics and philosophy, shaped the way economists conceived of their
expertise and how they conceive of the nature of science. I have also argued
that these ideas also created an intellectual division of labor among experts
who deal with economic facts and experts who deal with moral facts. While
that division may have originated, in part, in an embrace of the fact–value
distinction, once the divided expertise becomes associated with different
professional disciplines it does not require the acceptance of that distinction
to sustain itself.91
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Sidgwick.
33. For historical (and polemical) details, see Joseph Agassi, Science and Its History:
A Reassessment of the Historiography of Science (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008).
34. I leave it ambiguous to what degree Sidgwick advocated taking the conclusions of
ethics as some of the axioms in economics.
35. I am ignoring complex issues pertaining to the question to what degree Sidgwick
was a “Government House” utilitarian that also embraced esotericism (and, thus,
would not expect the second criterion of the technocratic conception to be
really true).
36. John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy, 3rd ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1904). Obviously, serious reﬂection on the philosophy economics
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und der politischen oekonomie insbesondere (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1883).
37. Keynes, Scope and Method, 60.
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Press, 2011), chapter 13.
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Ratcliffe, Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
41. Keynes, Scope and Method, 34. (A Google search reveals that Keynes did not
invent the phrase “normative economics,” but it was a term that had only recently
become more widely used.)
42. Ibid. Keynes tends to slide between treating positive economics as a simpliﬁed
abstraction and a purely factual science.
43. Ibid., 34–5.
44. Ibid., 5.
45. Ibid. Adam Smith’s “History of Astronomy” (published posthumously in 1795
and included in Essays on Philosophical Subjects, W.P.D. Wightman, J. C. Bryce,
and I.S. Ross (eds.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), offers a historical narrative
about successive revolutions among (psychologically) incommensurable systems
of thought in the sciences, which have regular patterns of development between
each revolution. Carl Menger knew about this work; see his Untersuchingen uber
die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie insebsodere
(Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883), 24. (I am unsure if Keynes was aware of
Smith’s “Astronomy” or that Menger knew of it.)
46. This image of science does not generate relativistic concerns in Keynes.
47. Keynes, Scope and Method, 51.
48. Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Signiﬁcance of Economic Science, 2nd
ed. (London: Macmillan, 1935), 132, 150–1.
49. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 231–2.
50. Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1947), 220.
51. For critical discussion of Robbins’ separation, see Amos Witztum, “Ethics and the
Science of Economics: Robbins’s Enduring Fallacy,” Journal of the History of
Economic Thought 33(2011): 467–86. See also A.B. Atkinson, “Economics as a
Moral Science,” Economica 76(2009): 791–804, who calls useful attention to the
ways in which value judgments inform tacit principles of application even in
purportedly neutral areas.
52. As Lord Keynes wrote to Sir Roy Harrod on July 4, 1938, “As against Robbins,
Economics is essentially a moral science. That is to say, it employs introspection
and judgement of value” <http://economia.unipv.it/harrod/edition/editionstuff/
rfh.346.htm>. For discussion, see John D. Davis, “Keynes’s View of Economics
as a Moral Science,” in Bradley W. Bateman and John B. Davis (eds.), Keynes and
Philosophy: Essays on the Origins of Keynes’s Thought (Aldershot, UK: Edward
Elgar, 1991), 89–103.
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see Frank H. Knight, “Ethics and the Economic Interpretation,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 36(1922): 454–81, and “The Ethics of Competition,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 37(1923): 579–624. For excellent discussion, see Ross
Emmett, “Frank H. Knight on the Conﬂict of Values in Economic Life,” Research
in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology 9(1992): 87–103.
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of Economic theory,” Modern Language Notes 108(1993): 759–803.
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31(2), available here <http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p00a/p0029.pdf>. For dis-
cussion see, especially, Edmond Malinvaud, “The Scientiﬁc Papers of Tjalling
C. Koopmans: A Review Article,” Journal of Economic Literature 10(1972):
798–802; see also the commentary in David F. Hendry and Mary S. Morgan
(eds.), The Foundations of Econometric Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1995).
56. Tjalling C. Koopmans, “Measurement without Theory,” Review of Economics and
Statistics 29(1947): 161–72, at 167.
57. For useful accounts see, J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., “Alternative Keynesian and Post
Keynesian Perspectives on Uncertainty and Expectations” Journal of Post Keynesian
Economics 23(2001): 545–66; Charles R. McCann, Jr., Probability Foundations of
Economic Theory (London: Routledge, 1994); and Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “The
Eclipse of the Uncertainty Concept inMainstream Economics,” Journal of Economic
Issues 45(2011): 159–76. On the signiﬁcance of randomness, see the concluding page
of the important review article by Kenneth J. Arrow, “Alternative Approaches to the
Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations,” Econometrica 19(1951): 401–37, and
the reference to the ﬁnal paragraph of Armen A. Alchian, “Uncertainty, Evolution,
and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 58(1950): 211–21.
58. Gary S. Becker, “Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political
Economy 70(1962): 1–13, at 5 (the entire page is relevant, and Becker cites
Alchian’s “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory”). For an interesting,
alternative discussion, see Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the
Collège de France, 1978–1979 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 269.
59. Roger E. Backhouse, “The Transformation of US Economics, 1920–1960, Viewed
Through a Survey of Journal Articles,” History of Political Economy, Number
Supplement 30(1998): 85–107. Some of the material in this section draws from
Eric Schliesser, “On Joseph Cropsey’s ‘What is Welfare Economics?’ ”, Ethics
125(2015): 847–50.
60. In 1970 Samuelson won the second Nobel Prize in economics for “raising the level
of analysis in economic science” (“The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1970,” <http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prize-
s/economic-sciences/laureates/1970/>). Joseph Cropsey puts it thus: “Professor
Samuelson’s position among mathematical economists is such that one who seeks
an example is not unjustiﬁed in turning to his works. I therefore recur to his
Foundations of Economic Analysis” (“What Is Welfare Economics?” Ethics
65(1955): 116–25, at 122).
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Economic Journal 70(1960): 197–265.
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63. Ibid., 358 (emphasis added); he quotes from Talcott Parsons, The Structure of
Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), 395.
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useless knowledge, not knowledge of human affairs; he lacks knowledge about the
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Parsons, see Schliesser, E. (2011). “The Surprising Weberian Roots to Milton
Friedman’s Methodology” in Explanation, Prediction, and Conﬁrmation (Nether-
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67. Stigler, “New Welfare Economics,” 357.
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results. See S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War
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Samuelson,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 43(1948): 603–5.
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